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Highlights  
• The human brain has a protracted developmental trajectory and is inherently 
adaptive    
• A dynamic, developmental aspect is largely missing from neurobiological 
models of psychopathology    
• Longitudinal data are key to progress in our understanding of social anxiety 
disorder 
• Analytical recommendations for longitudinal imaging studies are made    
 
Abstract 
Longitudinal studies offer a unique window into developmental change. Yet, 
most of what we know about the pathophysiology of psychiatric disorders is based on 
cross-sectional work. Here, we highlight the importance of adopting a longitudinal 
approach in order to make progress into the identification of neurobiological 
mechanisms of social anxiety disorder (SAD). Using examples, we illustrate how 
longitudinal data can uniquely inform SAD etiology and timing of interventions. The 
brain’s inherently adaptive quality requires that we model risk correlates of disorders 
as dynamic in their expression. Developmental theories regarding timing of 
environmental events, cascading effects and (mal)adaptations of the developing brain 
will be crucial components of comprehensive, integrative models of SAD. We close 
by discussing analytical considerations in working with longitudinal, developmental 
data. 
 
Introduction 
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The wider availability of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) facilities, together with 
increasingly sophisticated and streamlined analysis tools has led to a dramatic 
increase in studies detailing changes in neural achitectures with development. These 
advances in paediatric neuroimaging have deepened our appreciation of the prolonged 
post-natal brain maturation ongoing across the first decades of human life. As the 
primary organ within which interactions between genetic and environmental factors 
play out, the brain’s inherently adaptive quality requires that we model risk correlates 
as similarly dynamic in their expression. That is, a developmental perspective will be 
key to making significant progress towards understanding etiological pathways to, 
and identifying biomarkers for, psychiatric conditions. Yet, as will be evident in the 
review below, this dynamic aspect is still largely missing from neurobiological 
models of psychopathology.  
From the earliest beginnings of in-vivo imaging, especially functional MRI 
(fMRI), clinicans and scientists alike envisoned that brain-based data would quickly 
impact and inform psychiatric diagnoses (e.g., David, Blamire & Breiter, 1994). In 
particular, there were expectations that we would be able to determine biomarkers of 
atypical functioning, which would then also provide insights into the optimal type and 
timing of theraputic efforts. While a few examples of these do exist, so far, 
neuroimaging data has neither revolutionized nosology of mental health disorders, nor 
provided solid grounds to make recommendations about therapeutics for specific 
psychiatric disorders (e.g., Paulus, 2017). In this manuscript, we illustrate how 
charting developmental trajectories, focusing on within-subject designs, are central to 
our understanding of psychiatric etiology. Longitudinal designs have long been 
considered preferable in developmental work using MRI - not least because adding 
multiple time points per participant significantly increases power (Steen et al., 2007). 
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This is also reflected in recent consortium efforts such as the ABCD study1, which 
follows a large cohort of youth over the second decade of life, mapping functional and 
structural brain development in relation to a wide array of environmental and 
individual difference variables. However, with few notable exceptions (e.g., Cicchetti 
& Rogosch, 2002), in the field of psychopathology, there is little work using these 
designs to determine how trait-like individual differences in youth, measured as cross-
sectional correlates of psychiatric illness, may also be, or interact with, maturational 
differences.  
Here, we highlight how a comprehensive longitudinal approach is best suited 
to study risk correlates, and specifically how these data allow us to ‘connect the dots’ 
on some of the early indicators we have for sensitive periods and diverging 
trajectories, specifically in SAD. Sensitive periods are defined as time periods where 
environmental input or the lack thereof plays an increased role in shaping a neural 
system. We focus on the juncture of adolescence (spanning the years from late 
childhood to early adulthood) and review what is known about risk expression as the 
adolescent years unfold. Lastly, we provide some practical recommendations on the 
implementation of longitudinal modeling with multiple cognitive or environmental 
factors alongside brain-based indices of change in youth populations.  
Mapping change in individual trajectories 
Thus far, paediatric imaging studies of pathophysiology have mainly focused on case 
control comparisons with youths who fulfill certain diagnostic criteria, in order to 
identify disorder-related differences in activation or connectivity. Results of these 
studies paint a complex picture and are often inconsistent with respect to the 
                                                             
1 https://abcdstudy.org/ 
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directionality of group mean activation and connectivity of relevant brain regions in 
group comparisons of developmental or clinical and control groups. In part, these 
inconsistencies can be explained by the cross-sectional research approach. (see Figure 
1 for an illustration). A cross-sectional approach, even if adequately powered (which 
many neuroimaging studies are not, given effect sizes), can obscure developmental 
trends and the many different mechanisms at play that map onto different symptom 
profiles. Inconsistent findings may therefore reflect both heterogeneity within 
symptom-based diagnostic categories (i.e., sub-categories of brain-circuit 
dysfunction) and accentuated individual differences in development (i.e., differences 
in timing of developmental expression).  
Developmental timing of symptom onset may be a dimension suggestive of 
different mechanisms at play. In the context of a hierachical, region/circuit-specific 
pattern of brain maturation, it is plausible that both primary pathophysiology and 
secondary effects on developmental trajectories present differently. For instance, 
parietal and lateral frontal network regions may be more heavily relied on to carry out 
cognitive control tasks earlier in development with less reliance on medial and ventral 
frontal neural regions (e.g., Durston et al., 2006; Ordaz et al., 2013). Hence, as 
networks supporting cognitive control functions shift during development (alongside 
changes in cognitive stategies or performance), it is likely that clinically-relevant 
symptoms emerging along this developmental process have different neurobiological 
manifestations. 
Developmental timing will also give rise to secondary effects on maturational 
trajectories. Therefore, an understanding of circuit development will likely precede a 
comprehensive understanding of symptom-specific dysfunctions and the identification 
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of early biomarkers for psychiatric conditions. Within-subject designs uniquely parse 
out the degree to which "individual-differences" are really maturational differences or 
are time-invariant “trait” differences. Most likely, they will be a combination of both. 
In order to make room for the role of developmental timing and dynamic, conditional 
effects of risk factors and cascading effects of outcomes, it is critical that we move 
beyond cross-sectional designs and focus efforts on mapping change in individual 
trajectories over time.  
Mapping brain development 
Longitudinal designs including multiple brain scans of the same individual are 
a significant investment of time and resources, but the numerous theoretical gains 
warrant the costs. Placing the identification of psychiatric biomarkers in the context of 
development may seem like an impossible level of complexity to tackle, making room 
for sophisticated interactions between age/age of onset, symptoms and 
cognitive/emotional processes, and exploring age beyond linear trends. Paradoxically, 
we may find that mechanisms are easier to identify alongside discovering mechanistic 
principles of neural organization that cut across development and disorder. For 
instance, it can help us understand how cognitive functions are supported when 
specific regions or networks are less available or efficient, or the effects of 
hyper/hypo-activation of particular regions or networks on distributed neural activity 
within the network. These may be similar to processes relevant for disorder. But even 
beyond understanding principles of organization, there are many gains to be made. 
First, a key benefit of mapping developmental trajectories is that it would 
allow us to understand what constitutes typical variations and what represents risk or 
a risk trajectory in a given context. Building comprehensive, continuous trajectories 
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of cognitive and brain development in well characterized samples will allow us to 
differentiate the type of developmental differences (i.e., developmental delay, lag, 
deterioration or overall deficit; (Reichenberg et al., 2010; Figure 2B), diverging 
trajectories and changing risk correlates. Mechanistic insights crucial to therapeutic 
recommendations are almost impossible to gain with cross-sectional approaches, even 
with finely binned cross-sectional data. For instance, when studying a phenotype 
compared to healthy controls, it would be important to be able to distinguish a “delay 
in maturation” from a “deficit” explanation (as detailed in Figure 2B).  As illustrated 
in Figure 1, which treats the same set of data points as cross-sectional and 
longitudinal, the best model fit differs between the two designs. Hence, while the 
quadratic trend revealed in the longitudinal treatment of the data would support a 
delayed maturation explanation for the phenotype, the cross-sectional trend would 
support a deficit explanation.  Hence, longitudinal data is pertinent in differentiating 
these alternatives, especially in regard to the distinction between maturational and 
stable deficit.  
 
Insert Figure 1 and 2 here 
Secondly, mapping individual trajectories of change in developing populations 
will allow us to understand whether there are periods of significant and rapid 
maturation of particular networks. Rapid change of individual structures or functional 
maturation does not necessarily mean that these structures or functions are 
particularly amenable to external influence (in terms of both environmental insult and 
intervention) at the time of change. However, it is plausible that early emerging 
functions will result in earlier brain specialization, thus likely leaving the 
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cognitive/brain function in question less amenable to interventions at later time points 
(Johnson, Jones, & Gliga, 2015). Hence, differentiating changes that are unique to a 
developmental period from those that are non-specific on-going changes, or emerging 
changes that will mature at the later stage (Figure 2A; (Casey, 2013) may be an 
important piece of the puzzle. When mapping change in relation to external factors, 
we can move closer to understanding whether there are sensitive periods for the 
development of certain functions and impact of particular (therapeutic) experiences.   
Each type of developmental difference and pathway comes with its own 
implications for therapeutic approaches. For example, we could develop programs 
that target specific points of divergence from typical trajectories, or help to 
compensate for delay early on. No matter how these trajectories play out, getting a 
better handle on timing information, i.e. understanding when and how risk factors are 
expressed in development, will be crucial if we are to devise interventions that target 
both brain function and behavior effectively (Cohen Kadosh, Linden, & Lau, 2013; 
Johnson et al., 2015). Choice and timing of therapeutics for at-risk youths is 
particularly tricky. Whilst “the earlier the better” may appear to be the most intuitive 
approach, intervening early for those at risk is a more delicate decision and balance. 
In the following section, we illustrate the benefits of this approach, using 
examples from either the developmental or clinical neuroscience literature to show 
how key findings in the literature need to be extended with longitudinal data. Social 
anxiety disorder (SAD) lends itself well as an illustrative clinical example, with a 
body of work on a reliably identified early risk profile (behavioral inhibition). It is 
noteworthy that the processes discussed below are affected across several psychiatric 
illnesses; from a functional standpoint, key processes are those that track with several 
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symptom dimensions (e.g., reward and threat processing, attention and cognitive 
control, working memory etc.). 
 
Adolescence as a time of risk expression: the case of social anxiety disorder 
Adolescence is a transitional period, marked by changes on many levels: changes in 
brain structure and function, genetic and hormonal innovations alongside puberty, as 
well as social-environmental changes (e.g., Dahl, 2004). As early as prenatal 
development, risk factors such as adverse environments and factors intrinsic to the 
brain such as the quality of neural processing (i.e., the sampling of the early 
environment) significantly impact cognitive and emotional variables (e.g., Anderson, 
2003). It may be that that these early risks only find their full expression during the 
second decade of life. The timing of adolescence-associated social, hormonal and 
neural changes may compound risk for mental health disorders in this developmental 
period (Haller, Cohen Kadosh, & Lau, 2015; Haller, Cohen Kadosh, Scerif, & Lau, 
2016; Keshavan, Giedd, Lau, Lewis, & Paus, 2014; Paus, Keshavan, & Giedd, 2008). 
In the psychiatric literature, adolescence has long been recognized a period of great 
vulnerability: age-of-onset data suggest that first impairing symptoms of many 
psychiatric disorders, including anxiety disorders, often emerge at the adolescent 
juncture (Kessler et al., 2005; Wittchen et al., 1999). 
SAD is one such example. There is a pronounced increase of SAD 
symptomatology at the juncture of adolescence, persisting to explain a significant 
proportion of adult SAD (Gregory et al., 2007a; Kessler et al., 2005a,b; Wittchen et 
al., 1999). The hallmark of SAD is a disabling and persistent fear and consequential 
avoidance of social situations (APA, 1994). Individuals with SAD fear negative 
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evaluation and social rejection with concerns usually centering on thoughts of 
humiliation and embarrassment (Clark and Wells, 1995; Foa et al., 1996). SAD often 
has a chronic course and is associated with co-morbid depressive symptoms and low 
self-esteem (Cox et al., 2004). Since peer interactions carry important learning 
experiences for adolescents, avoidance of social exchanges is likely particularly 
impairing and disruptive during adolescence (Miers et al., 2014). Additionally, as 
poor social interactions in school environments also impact academic success, 
intervening early is all the more important. What do we know about processing 
characteristic of SAD and the way in which the adaptive, dynamic brain adjusts to 
biased input? 
 
Threat interpretation 
In many ways, SAD represents a more exaggerated presentation of a typical 
developmental phenomenon in adolescence: increased salience and reactivity to social 
cues and sensitivity to social exclusion. Central to cognitive models of (social) 
anxiety are systematic biases in the way social information is processed (e.g., Clark & 
Wells, 1995). Biases are thought to give rise to preferential processing of threatening 
information, maintaining social fears by shaping maladaptive patterns of social 
avoidance. For instance, skewed interpretations of everyday ambiguous social 
experiences (e.g., a frown of an audience member during your presentation or a laugh 
behind you in the hallway – note that social interactions are often ambiguous as one 
must always infer mental states indirectly via verbal/non-verbal cues) have generally 
shown robust associations with social anxiety (Stopa and Clark, 2000; Amin et al., 
1998; Amir et al., 2012; Constans et al., 1999; Huppert et al., 2003). Developmental 
differences in interpretational style and its links to (social) anxiety have been found in 
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cross-sectional work, with more robust associations between social anxiety and 
interpretations of social stimuli across studies in adolescent samples compared to 
younger populations (e.g., Cresswell et al., 2014; Miers et al., 2008). It is possible that 
interpretational style is more malleable to interventions before adolescence; with the 
growing importance of peers and socio-cultural norms increasingly guiding behavior, 
it is likely that social cue interpretation fine-tunes during puberty. With increasing 
age, youths have a greater quantity of social experiences to inform their thinking, and 
cognitive styles may also become more stable and global (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 1992; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1996). Hence, interpretational style may only become 
sufficiently stable and function as a maintenance factor in adolescence, not earlier in 
development. 
Increased affective responding to negative social cues in youths with SAD or 
youth selected for increased social worries have been linked to increased amygdala 
sensitivity as well as differential responses in several frontal regions such as the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), medial PFC (mPFC), ventro/dorsal-lateral PFC 
(vl/dlPFC) and insula (e.g., Battaglia et al., 2012; Jarcho et al., 2016; Killgore and 
Yurgelun-Todd, 2005). These data have been replicated and extended with tasks that 
engage the participant in more dynamic social exchanges online (Jarcho et al., 2013; 
Guyer et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2011b). Brain networks implicated in perturbed 
processing in SAD are those documented to undergo prolonged structural and 
functional change across adolescence (Mills et al., 2014; Goddings et al., 2014). 
Cross-sectional data on typically developing youths suggest that sensitivities in the 
neural responses of subcortical affect- and reward-processing regions such as the 
amygdala and striatum to simple threatening or rewarding stimuli peak around 
adolescence (Chein et al., 2011; Ernst et al., 2005; Passarotti et al., 2009; Somerville 
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et al., 2011; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). There is some contention as to whether 
these peak sensitivities occur before, at the start, or in mid-adolescence (Hare et al., 
2008; Somerville et al., 2011; 2013; Gee et al., 2013). Functional developmental 
trajectories of frontal areas in response to socio-affective stimuli are equally complex, 
with reports of adolescent-emergent or -unique trends in tasks that require automatic 
or effortful emotion regulation (e.g., McRae et al., 2012; Somerville et al., 2013). 
Inconsistencies in the directionality of functional developmental differences in 
child/adolescent/adult groups across studies have made it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about developmental change (Crone & Dahl, 2012). It is plausible that 
age and/or pubertal status may significantly affect how social stimuli are processed, 
possibly obscuring more subtle SAD-related differences. Overall, it is clear that we 
need to integrate findings on SAD-linked functional responses of key emotion 
generation and regulation regions with the emerging corpus of work on typical 
developmental trajectories of peak sensitivities of regions in these networks to 
understand when and how neural trajectories diverge.  
  
Emotion regulation 
As well as studying mean activation differences in individual regions, recent studies 
have explored typical and anxiety-linked developmental changes in functional 
connectivity between regions of social-affective and social-cognitive brain networks. 
Task-based functional connectivity is an indicator of co-activation between different 
areas during engagement in different task conditions (Friston, 2011) and may 
represent an approach that more closely aligns with the notion that computations are 
carried out in concert, by distributed networks. However, changes in coupling (as 
opposed to a valence ‘switch’ in connectivity) can be difficult to interpret, as we 
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cannot know what drives differences (i.e., it could be either node, both nodes or the 
connectivity between nodes, or a third region influencing both regions). With this in 
mind, different functional connectivity patterns and age-related changes of these 
patterns in response to emotionally evocative stimuli in youths with increased levels 
of (social) anxiety have been reported in a handful of studies (e.g., Spielberg et al., 
2015; Gold et al., 2016; Hardee et al., 2013). Findings are inconsistent and difficult to 
compare across studies, due to the different task-related processes studied and specific 
contrasts employed across studies. Some studies find increased negative coupling in 
youths with anxiety in fronto-limbic circuits, both in task conditions where attention 
is explicitly directed at threat features of stimuli (e.g., Gold et al., 2016) or where 
attention capture by threat is bottom-up (Hardee et al., 2013). Other studies have 
found no difference (e.g., McClure et al., 2007) or significantly less negative coupling 
(e.g., Monk et al., 2008; Hare et al., 2008) in anxious youths as compared to typically 
developing peers. Two studies have additionally examined age as a factor. Gold and 
colleagues (2016) reported that anxious adolescents exhibited the inverse task-related 
connectivity than anxious adults, with increased negative coupling of amygdala-PFC 
circuit in anxious adolescents and increased positive coupling in anxious adults during 
threat appraisal. Kujawa and colleagues (2016) reported a positive association 
between amygdala-ACC connectivity and age in anxious youths during a face-
emotion processing task, with the reverse age trend observed in the typically 
developing controls.  
These results are particularly interesting in the context of two lines of work. 
First, recent cross-sectional studies on typical developmental changes in functional 
connectivity have documented a normative developmental ‘switch’ from positive to 
negative connectivity in the amygdala-medial PFC network when viewing emotional 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
When change is the only constant - 14 - 
faces compared to a baseline condition (i.e., non-threat specific) (Gee et al., 2013a; 
Wu et al., 2016). The authors reported that children aged 4-9 years showed positive 
connectivity, whilst from early adolescence (10-13 years) to adulthood, youths 
exhibited negative connectivity (Gee et al., 2013a). Additionally, the authors found 
that the switch in coupling related to individual differences in declining separation 
anxiety.  
Secondly, work examining the effects of early adverse experiences on 
functional connectivity of limbic-prefrontal circuits in youth samples consistently 
suggests that childhood social experiences result in neural adaptions in these circuits 
(although we note that it is often difficult to disentangle heritable vulnerability from 
the quantified environmental factors) (e.g., Herringa et al., 2016; Gee et al., 2013b; 
Silvers et al., 2016). Specifically, Gee and colleagues (2013b) found that early 
adversity is associated with a shift in timing of the normative amygdala-PFC 
connectivity pattern. The authors found that youths who had experienced early 
caregiving adversity exhibited negative amygdala-mPFC connectivity (the more 
“mature” phenotype) earlier in development. There is also evidence that these 
adaptions are linked to internalizing outcomes. Results from studies by Silvers and 
colleagues (2016) and Herringa and colleagues (2016) suggest that increased fronto-
limbic connectivity to negative stimuli may represent an adaptive augmentation in this 
population, a source of resilience against internalizing symptoms in adolescence. 
Childhood adversity predicted increased connectivity in this circuit only in 
adolescents with low levels of internalizing symptoms (Herringa et al., 2016). While 
both lines of work speak to this circuit being a potential developmental target, the 
latter highlights that we need to be cautious and contextualize what we determine to 
be adaptive. Together, this body of work highlights the importance of interpreting 
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pathophysiological findings in youth in the light of age-related change; risk and 
resilience trajectories and pathophysiological underpinnings of subgroups need to be 
discerned with longitudinal data. 
 
Behavioral inhibition 
There have been several studies looking at behavioral inhibition (BI) as a risk profile 
to understand pathways to SAD (Goldsmith and Gottesman, 1981; Matheny, 1989). 
BI is a reliably and early identified temperamental factor that is associated with 
heightened sensitivity to novel situations and people, and avoidance of unfamiliar 
stimuli in general (Kagan et al., 1987). Evidence from both longitudinal and high-risk 
family studies has demonstrated that BI is a developmental and familial risk factor for 
anxiety disorders, specifically SAD (Biederman et al., 2014; Clauss & Blackford, 
2012; Hayward et al., 1998; Rosenbaum et al., 2000; Schwartz et al., 1999;). 
Interestingly, although BI is often used as an early proxy for SAD, there is large 
variability in outcome with many children developing neither clinical nor sub-clinical 
levels of social anxiety – BI represents only one possible pathway to clinical anxiety. 
What are the mechanisms fueling the BI to SAD risk trajectory, what are the 
mechanisms of continuity and change? 
  Numerous studies have found evidence for biased attention orienting (i.e., 
preferential orienting and/or maintenance of attention to social threat such as angry 
faces) in adults and youth with SAD or with high trait levels of social anxiety relative 
to their non-socially anxious controls (e.g., Roy et al., 2008; Stirling, Eley & Clark, 
2006) with some suggestion for more complex attentional patterns of hyper vigilance-
avoidance depending on length of threat exposure (e.g., Kircanski, Joormann & 
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Gotlib, 2015). Similarly, there is some evidence suggesting that children with BI also 
show atypical attentional patterns (Pérez-Edgar et al., 2010; Kindt et al., 1997, Pine et 
al., 2009), which act as moderators between early temperament and later anxiety 
symptoms by biasing the information processed (Pérez-Edgar et al., 2010; 2011). 
Specifically, a stable hyper-vigilant attention bias pattern is thought to increase risk 
for SAD onset in early adolescence for BI children (Fox, 2010) - although the small 
number of studies and inconsistent results make it difficult to disentangle the timing 
and emergence of the (likely reciprocal) relations between attention orienting patterns, 
BI and risk for SAD. While some fMRI work has compared youth with a history with 
BI to either healthy volunteers or youth with anxiety disorders on relevant tasks 
(Hardee et al., 2013; Pérez-Edgar et al., 2010), very little work has examined BI by 
social anxiety by age symptom interactions to directly assess the BI to SAD link.  
   Another body of work examining the role of attention in the BI pathway to 
SAD has focused on response monitoring (i.e., regulating behavior, based on 
attending and subsequently adjusting one’s output) and inhibition. These processes 
that are more effortful in their execution are thought to have a more prolonged 
maturational trajectory than the more automatic attention orienting described above. 
Both cross-sectional and longitudinal studies have found evidence that networks 
underpinning attentional control, including the dorso-lateral and medial (dl/mPFC), 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and parietal regions, continue to develop throughout 
adolescence with performance gains alongside increases in activation such as the 
dorsal ACC (Henderson, Pine & Fox, 2014; Munakata, Snyder & Chatham, 2012; 
Ordaz et al., 2013, Rothbart and Rueda, 2005). Relations among effortful control, BI 
and risk for SAD are complex, such that effortful control may moderate risk, i.e. it is 
plausible that increased inhibitory control promotes inflexibility of attentional 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
When change is the only constant - 17 - 
deployment in social contexts, thereby inflating developmental risk for SAD 
specifically in youth with a history of BI (i.e., only conferring risk in this subgroup), 
while linking to positive outcomes in non-BI youth. The body of work on the neural 
underpinnings of attention control using fMRI in this population is small but growing. 
An early study (Jarcho et al., 2013) demonstrated that adults with a history of BI 
performed similarly on an emotion-based attention control task but showed increased 
neural responses in the dmPFC during trials requiring effortful control. It is unclear 
when this, presumably compensatory, activation pattern first emerges, whether it 
represents a “trait-like” correlate of BI or whether it emerges along the developmental 
path as cognitive control and regulation networks mature. It is also unclear how this 
activation pattern links to SAD across development. Given that there are many 
different pathways to SAD, it may be that, for instance, despite being phenotypically 
identical, neural manifestations of SAD in individuals with and without BI are 
different, both with regards to maturational timing and overall pathophysiological 
architecture. Further, longitudinal data are needed to understand the mechanisms of 
change in the BI to SAD trajectory, especially in the key period of adolescence where 
youth often move from at-risk status to experiencing clinically significant and 
impairing SAD. A better understanding of trajectories in at-risk groups would greatly 
impact therapeutics for SAD in these subgroups.  
BI risk unfolds as attention control systems mature. Interventions targeting 
attention biases/control often require sustaining attention to complete a repetitive task 
to train attention control or change a processing bias; hence we may see intervention 
effects increase linearly or possibly in a quadratic fashion (reaching a plateau or 
declining towards adulthood) from childhood to adolescence – at least in anxious 
youth. When thinking about targeted early intervention for at-risk youth, 
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understanding trajectories is particularly important. BI at-risk status will not, in the 
majority of cases, result in clinically impairing levels of anxiety. Training attention 
control in a BI child could potentially have adverse effects resulting in a lack of 
attentional flexibility (i.e., via increasing compensatory activation in the ACC). Our 
understanding of pathways to the SAD phenotype, risk and protective mechanisms 
and how these play out across development is still very limited. Therapeutic 
experiences ought to have more impact during periods of increased plasticity due to 
maturing neural circuitry. Hence, therapeutics in pediatric at-risk populations requires 
weighing considerations of vulnerability and opportunity. 
 
Remaining questions 
In order to move our understanding of developmental paths to anxiety forward, it will 
be crucial to assess whether the transition to adolescence represents an inflection 
point (i.e., a time of significant change in typical development) or/and a central point 
of divergence for anxiety-relevant functional connectivity indices between key 
emotion regulation regions. Are differences in functional connectivity already present 
before puberty? If so, do differences become more pronounced? Is an early or delayed 
valence change of coupling related to, or predictive of, a rise of anxiety in 
adolescence? How much ‘normative’ variability is there at the juncture to adolescence 
and how does this relate to indices of pubertal status and significant social 
experiences (e.g., parenting, positive and negative peer interactions)? How do youth 
at risk (e.g., youth with a history of BI) compare – does this juncture represent a time 
when risk groups diverge rapidly? What about compensatory adaptions and how do 
these inform therapeutics in at-risk youth? Should preventions target at-risk youth 
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before or during adolescence? Only when we go beyond cross-sectional approaches to 
chart individual trajectories and links with anxiety, can we answer these questions 
comprehensively. Once we have determined when critical maturational time courses 
occur, we can move to determine whether, for instance, changes in coupling also 
represent windows at which external influences (i.e., therapeutic efforts) have 
increased impact, whether training abilities preemptively can shape trajectories 
towards more adaptive outcomes or whether these functions remain plastic and 
malleable into adulthood. 
 
 
Interim conclusion 
Together, these examples illustrate why it is important to go beyond extrapolating 
predictions from adult models to understand i) developmental changes in risk 
correlates and cognitive phenotypes and ii) timing of symptom onset (or prediction of 
transition to disorder) by assessing how potentially unique cognitive and emotional 
trajectories in normative development may shape and bring out risks at certain 
developmental periods. It is plausible that typical developmental processes in 
adolescence exaggerate individual differences and perceived functional impairment, 
as maturational trajectories change neural dynamics alongside increasingly 
sophisticated cognitive skills and newfound autonomy. It is only when we chart 
developmental trajectories, that we can test these mechanistic hypotheses directly.  
It is enticing to think that progress in developmental cognitive neuroscience 
and biological psychiatry will be made by singular, big discoveries and paradigm 
shifts. Given the complexity of research questions and the limitations of current 
imaging tools, it is more likely that progress in this field will be a gradual affair, 
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driven by collaborative efforts. In line with this, we need to support work on 
reliability of fMRI measures and encourage data sharing to establish larger datasets. 
Large data can capture the heterogeneity of adolescent samples and disorders (e.g., 
gender specific trajectories and outcomes) to ultimately be able to establish 
standardized scores of variability in function and structure across development. 
Thinking about new ways of phenotyping participants, assessing risk, balancing a 
trans-diagnostic framework with examining specificity of pathophysiology and 
outcomes, are among some of the newer challenges when designing a longitudinal 
study. In the next section, we will discuss some of the basic analytical considerations 
when working with longitudinal, developmental imaging data. 
 
Data-analytic recommendations  
“Change is the only constant” could describe both the rapid evolution of imaging 
methods and best practices in data analysis and reporting. Despite constant change, 
there are certain basic considerations for modeling changes in the brain during 
development that are distinct from those used for cross-sectional data analysis (for 
further reading see Mills & Tamnes, 2014; King et al., this issue). Given their 
complexity, longitudinal designs require access to better computational resources and 
training. Arguably, longitudinal studies also require more up-front work to settle on 
the best design and analysis plan to test the change processes of interest. Hence, there 
are several decisions that must be handled carefully when undertaking a project that 
models brain developmental trajectories. A few of these considerations are outlined 
below.  
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Measure of development 
When modeling developmental change, it is essential to first define the measure of 
development. In the developmental neuroimaging literature, this measure is almost 
always chronological age, but other studies have attempted to model brain 
development along other developmental measures such as puberty (e.g., Goddings et 
al., 2013), or other measures of body growth (e.g., height or weight). The 
developmental measure used will in part determine the kind of models that can be 
used to describe the data. Given that body growth and puberty follow non-linear 
trajectories, different kinds of models might need to be tested from those tested 
against linearly developing measures (e.g., age). 
It is worth considering how the measures of development could relate to 
different underlying mechanisms driving brain changes. For example, if the research 
focus is on cortical brain changes in the transition into adolescence, modeling these 
changes against pubertal development might yield different results than modeling 
against age. Further, modeling change against pubertal measures would be beneficial 
for samples with short age ranges, but larger pubertal variation. 
Ultimately, the measure of development will constrain the interpretation of the 
results. While age is an easily quantifiable measure of development, relating brain 
changes to this measure cannot tell us about the potential impact of biological 
processes such as puberty or body growth. 
 
Initial data processing 
Many choices about parameters are made in the pre-processing stages of imaging 
analysis – with what could be considered a problematic amount of analytic flexibility 
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(Carp, 2012). Unfortunately, for longitudinal scanning studies in particular, it is easy 
to add bias by inadvertently applying a process that is particular to only one time-
point (most commonly being with regard to time one). Any particular analysis of a 
longitudinal dataset should strive for consistency in data processing for all participant 
and sessions. Variation in operating system and software version has been shown to 
affect brain measures that are used to quantify brain change (Gronenschild et al., 
2012). The different treatment of baseline images, wherein only follow-up images are 
re-sampled, must also be avoided (Reuter & Fischl, 2011). Interpolation asymmetry 
resulting from within-subject registration has been shown to introduce artifacts that 
lead to bias in subsequent session data, where the difference between baseline and the 
first interval is disproportionately higher than changes across the overall trajectory 
(see Fox, Ridgway, & Schott, 2011 for an illustrative example). Algorithms have been 
developed wherein inverse consistency is achieved, such that each time point is 
treated identically and registration is thus fully symmetric (e.g., Reuter, Schmansky, 
Rosas, & Fischl, 2012; Wachinger, Golland, Magnain, Fischl, & Reuter, 2015)2.    
 
Multilevel modeling 
Longitudinal data are not suitable for simple regression analysis, as data obtained 
from the same individual cannot be considered independent. There are multiple 
analytic strategies that can handle the continuous dependent (within-participant) and 
independent (between-participant) variables present in longitudinal data. Which 
analytic strategy to use will depend on the kind of data as well as the research 
question. 
                                                             
2 such as is implemented in FreeSurfer’s longitudinal pipeline 
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu) 
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Typical linear regression models can estimate the overall group-level trends, 
or fixed effects. These models are typically employed in cross-sectional studies 
characterizing age-related changes in brain measures of interest. Multilevel models, 
also known as mixed-effects models, can estimate the fixed effects of a chosen 
variable on a measure of interest while also taking into account the dependence of 
observations obtained from the same individual. This can be done by setting a random 
intercept for each participant in addition modeling group means (fixed effects). By 
adding a random intercept to the model, each individual’s developmental pattern is 
modeled with a regression line parallel to the overall regression line (group trend), 
which can account for overall differences in values for individuals. Practically, in 
developmental cognitive neuroscience, setting a random intercept can allow the model 
to account for the variability of individual brain anatomy and function. 
Setting a random slope can allow further flexibility in the model by removing 
the assumption that individuals are going to change in the same way. This can be 
helpful for investigations of how individual differences or psychopathology affect the 
pace of brain development. For example, if it is hypothesized that some individuals 
will show slower cortical development than others (e.g. a different rate of change), a 
random slope might improve the fit of the model. Examining the random slope for 
each participant, it is possible to identify individuals showing aberrant growth 
patterns from the group average. Further, by examining the relationship between an 
individual’s random intercept and slope, it is possible to examine patterns between an 
individual’s overall measure and rate of change in the measure. For example, in a 
study examining how brain structure changes over age (starting from the earliest age 
point in the sample), correlating the random intercepts to the random slopes can 
illustrate if individuals with larger/smaller brain measures also exhibit slower/faster 
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developmental trajectories. However, it is necessary to have at least three data points 
before a random slope can be useful. Further, these models also allow for data to be 
collected at uneven intervals, which makes this technique particularly attractive to 
longitudinal datasets with an accelerated design.  
How the level 1 predictor is coded in a model has implications for the 
interpretation of the predicted model (Biesanz et al. 2004). For example, if age is used 
as the developmental measure of interest (the level 1 predictor), it can be centered 
with the grand mean (e.g. by subtracting the mean age of the sample from each 
individual’s age). When this particular centering procedure is applied prior to 
modeling the data, the estimates provided must be interpreted from the grand mean of 
the sample. But time can also be centered to different points along the timeframe of 
interest if the study’s aims are to understand developmental changes from a specific 
starting or ending point. For example, if an investigator is interested in understanding 
how developmental trajectories might diverge as the sample get older, centering to 
earliest age of the sample will allow the model estimates to be interpreted from this 
age forward. 
Drawing from the literature discussed in the example section, applying 
multilevel modeling to investigations of behavioral inhibition (BI) and anxiety 
disorders could increase our ability to identify risk correlates related to developmental 
maturity. For example, if it is hypothesized that children with BI who develop biased 
attention patterns before adolescence will have a higher risk for developing anxiety 
disorders in adolescence, a longitudinal study assessing these measures across 
childhood and adolescence is necessary to identify if one of these periods represents a 
time of increased risk. Further, a longitudinal design will not only establish group 
norms for the trajectory of attention processes during the developmental period of 
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interest, but also allow for individual patterns of development to be identified and 
compared. Some individuals might show a slower pace or reach different levels at 
different points in development; these two factors can be assessed by including a 
random intercept and a random slope in a multilevel model. Including measures of 
brain function and anatomy into this design can allow for hypotheses regarding how 
neurocognitive strategies or brain maturity further distinguish individuals at risk from 
those following divergent patterns that do not necessarily relate to maladaptive 
outcomes.   
Practically, several neuroimaging software packages are now able to 
implement multilevel analyses, and new methods are being developed to overcome 
computational limitations inherent in massively univariate analysis (for a discussion 
see Madhyastha et al., this issue). For example, linear mixed-effects (LME) models 
implemented in Freesurfer’s longitudinal pipeline (Reuter et al., 2012) apply iterative 
algorithms such that convergence in model fitting may not be consistently achieved, 
which can lead to invalid results for some voxels. To overcome this issue, Guillaume, 
Hua, Thompson, Waldorp, and Nichols (2014) developed an alternative, non-iterative 
Sandwich Estimator3. Here, a simple ordinary least squares model is specified for the 
marginal model to create parameter estimates of interest. A Sandwich Estimator is 
used for the standard error of these estimates, to account for the repeated 
measurements. This approach has the advantage of reduced model complexity as 
random effects are not specified, although the use of unstructured error covariance 
permits all random effects to be accounted for. Moreover, because it is non-iterative, 
this implementation benefits from significantly reduced computational time.  
                                                             
3 available from www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/sci/statistics/staff/academic-
research/nichols/software/swe 
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Model selection 
Several considerations factor into choosing the kind of model to fit to your data. The 
rule of thumb for modeling is to go with the simplest model that best describes the 
data. This heuristic of parsimony means finding a model that explains the most 
amount of variance using the least number of parameters. While it might be tempting 
to include all the measures you have for a particular dataset into your model, it is 
likely that a model with so many parameters will not translate to a new sample (called 
overfitting). Therefore, much of the literature on brain developmental trajectories has 
favored parametric models (Raznahan et al., 2011; Vijayakumar et al., 2016). 
However, nonparametric modeling, such as spline modeling, is also a potential 
avenue for mapping more precise developmental trajectories across larger 
developmental periods (e.g., Tamnes et al., 2013; Walhovd et al., 2016).  
 
Parametric modeling 
When applying parametric models to data, it is essential to choose models that are 
physiologically plausible. This will depend on the sample’s developmental period as 
well as the brain measure of interest. One study might hypothesize distinct 
developmental trends for a sample spanning childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, 
and the parametric model will need to account for this. For example, as cortical 
thickness is highest in the first decade, decreases across the second decade, and 
stabilizes in the third decade (Tamnes et al., 2017), a study spanning these ages might 
choose to fit a cubic (polynomial) model to the data to capture the change in slope at 
the beginning and end of the examined age range. However, a study investigating the 
second decade alone might be best suited examining the linear trajectories of the 
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cortical thickness. Further, it is also plausible to fit a logarithmic, exponential, or 
other growth curve model to certain age periods, depending the data and underlying 
physiology. 
Visualizing the raw data can assist in model selection, but it is also important 
to compare models with their simpler counterparts. Second and third-order 
polynomial models are attractive because they are able to characterize the nonlinear 
trends present across brain development. While a cubic polynomial model might 
provide a significant fit to the data, the quadratic or even linear model might be 
considered the better fit. This can be determined by comparing values representing the 
goodness of fit of a model and likelihood ratio tests. While likelihood ratio tests can 
only be performed between nested models, goodness of fit measures like the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) can be used to 
compare models that are not nested because they are standardized measures that take 
into account the goodness of fit of a chosen model, penalizing for complexity. Indeed, 
one of the advantages of using parametric models when examining brain 
developmental trajectories is that they allow for easy comparison of factors that could 
be influencing the development of the brain measure of interest. Comparing models 
with added fixed effect variables, such as group affiliation or an individual trait, 
allows for researchers to quantify the effect size of a particular variable on the fitted 
developmental trajectory. 
 
Nonparametric models 
Nonparametric models such as spline models have the advantage of mapping more 
precise developmental trajectories, and are becoming more common developmental 
neuroimaging analyses. There are several spline fitting procedures that can be used, 
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including Generalized Additive Mixed Modeling (Walhovd et al., 2016), Generalized 
Estimating Equations (Chen et al., 2014), and Penalized Spline Mixed-Effect Models 
(Alexander-Bloch et al., 2014). Rather than specifying the precise structure expected 
to fit the data, spline modeling procedures attempt to identify the points of inflection 
in a developmental trajectory. Similar to parametric models, it is possible to specify a 
developmental model for a reference population using nonparametric models, and 
then characterize how this model might differ in another sample (e.g., different 
overall size of measure, different rate of change). New spline modeling techniques are 
being developed that take into account not only the time-varying correlation structure 
between different developmental segments, but also the expected weaker correlation 
between data points acquired from the same participant across longer intervals (Chen 
et al., 2014). 
 
Differential equation models 
It is also possible to specify differential equation models that take into account 
the within-participant dependence of observations (just like multilevel models). These 
multilevel differential equation models might be useful for studies investigating the 
additive effects of reaching certain developmental milestones off-tempo from the 
“neurotypical”, expected trajectory. Differential equation models have just started to 
be implemented in developmental cognitive neuroscience (Ziegler et al., 2017). It is 
important to keep in mind that these equations assume continuous change in a given 
process and require several time points to generate a stable model. As longitudinal 
developmental neuroimaging datasets continue to grow and incorporate more time 
points (e.g., ABCD), we will begin to realize the applicability of more sophisticated 
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modeling approaches to our investigations of brain-behavior relationships across 
development. 
Conclusion 
Thus far, neuroimaging data have yet to make significant contributions to 
nosology or treatment of psychiatric disorders. What would it take for neuroimaging 
data to be useful? Following well-phenotyped at-risk groups as development unfolds 
allows us to understand how the adaptive, dynamic brain adjusts to biased input and 
processing. Additionally, using longitudinal designs to study emergent function will 
contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of how processes and 
computations are carried out in different (functional) networks. Placing the 
identification of biomarkers of psychiatric conditions in the context of development 
may seem like an impossible level of complexity to tackle. Here, we have argued that 
a developmental perspective may, in fact, provide a way to wrestle with the 
complexity of pathophysiology and help to extrapolate system-level neurocognitive 
mechanisms of disorder. Developmental data will be a significant step towards 
deriving integrative, dynamic models of psychiatric conditions. Developmental ideas 
of timing of environmental events, cascading effects and (mal)adaptations of the 
developing brain need to be key components of these models.  
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Figure 1. Hypothetical data to illustrate how longitudinal designs can reveal 
developmental trends that may remain obscured in cross-sectional data. The same 
data treated i) cross-sectional (left) ii) longitudinal (right). The model with the best fit 
for the data treated cross-sectionally is linear whereas the optimal fit model for the 
same data treated longitudinally is quadratic. 
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Figure 2. A) Hypothesized patterns of cognitive and brain development during 
adolescence. Of particular concern for the current paper are the adolescent-specific 
changes, which are likely to indicate a period of heightened plasticity for development 
(Adapted with permission from Casey, 2013). B) Hypothesized developmental 
trajectories of functioning (Adapted with permission from Reichenberg et al., 2010).  
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